Leviathan

by Thomas Hobbes

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Hobbes's treatise on human nature, the social contract, and sovereign authority out of the state of nature.

WITH AN ESSAY BY THE LATE VV. G. POGSON SMITH

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IT was well known to all students of philosophy and history in Oxford, and to many others, that W. G. Pogson Smith had been for many years engaged in preparing for an exhaustive treatment of the place of Hobbes in the history of European thought, and that he had accumulated a great mass of materials towards this. These materials fill many notebooks, and are so carefully arranged and indexed that it is clear that with a few more months he would have been able to produce a work worthy of a very high place in philosophical literature. Unhappily the work that he could have done him self cannot be done by any one else unless he has given something like the same time and brings to the collection something like the same extensive and intimate knowledge of the philosophy of the period as Pogson Smith possessed. It is hoped indeed that, by the permission of his representatives, this great mass of material will be deposited in the Bodleian Library and made available for scholars, and that thus the task which he had undertaken may some time be carried out.

Among his papers has been found an essay which presents a very interesting and suggestive treatment

of the position of Hobbes. The essay is undated, and it is quite uncertain for what audience it was prepared. It is this essay which is here published as an introduction to the Leviathan. It is printed with only the necessary verification of references, and one or two corrections of detail. It is always difficult to judge how far it is right to print work which the author himself has not revised, but we feel that, while something must inevitably be lost, the essay has so much real value that, even as it stands, it should be published. Something may even be gained for the reader in the fresh and unconstrained character of the paper. The pursuit of the ideal of a perfect and rounded criticism, which all serious scholars aim at, has sometimes the unfortunate result of depriving a man's work of some spontaneity. In Oxford at any rate, and it is probably the case everywhere, many a scholar says his best things and expresses his most pene trating judgements in the least formal manner. Those who were Mr. Pogson Smith's friends or pupils will find here much of the man himself — something of his quick insight, of his unconventional directness, of his broad but solid learning; something also of his profound feeling for truth, of his scorn of the pretentious, of his keen but kindly humour.

WHEREIN does the greatness of Hobbes consist ? It is a question I often put to myself, as I lay him down. It was a question which exercised his con temporaries — friends or foes — and drove them to their wits' end to answer. If I were asked to name the highest and purest philosopher of the seventeenth century I should single out Spinoza without a moment's hesitation. But Spinoza was not of the world ; and if a man will be perverse enough to bind the Spirit of Christ in the fetters of Euclid, how shall he find readers ? If I were asked to select the true founders of modern science I should bracket Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, and resolutely oppose Hobbes's claim to be of the company. If his studies in Vesalius prepared him to extend his approbation to Harvey's demonstration of the circulation of the blood, his animosity to Oxford and her professors would never allow him seriously to consider the claims of a science advanced by Dr. Wallis ; the sight of a page of algebraic symbols never elicited any feeling but one of sturdy contempt, and the remark that it looked ' as if a hen had been scratching there '. To the end of his days he dwelt among

points

of two dimensions, and superficies of three ; he squared the circle and he doubled the cube. ' 'Twas pity,' said Sir Jonas Moore, and many more, ' that he had not began the study of mathematics sooner, for such a working head would have made great advancement in it.' *

Of inductive science he is very incredulous. Bacon, contemplating ' in his delicious walkes at Gorham-bury ', might indeed better like Mr. Hobbes taking down his thoughts than any other, because he understood what he wrote ; he probably learnt to understand my Lord, who dictated his alphabet of simple natures, his receipts for the discovery of forms, his peddling experiments and his laborious conceits. I mention this because most German critics, with perhaps more than their usual careless audacity of assumption, find a niche for Hobbes as the spiritual fosterling of the great empiricist Bacon. Now if there was one thing for which Hobbes had neither sympathy nor even patience, it was experi mental science. The possession of a great telescope was no doubt a curious and useful delight ; but ' not every one that brings from beyond seas a new gin, or other jaunty device, is therefore a philosopher '.2 Let the gentlemen of Gresham College, whose energy it must be granted shames the sloth of our ancient universities, — let them apply themselves to Mr. Hobbes's doctrine of motion, and then he will deign

to cast an eye on their experiments. He did not think their gropings would carry them very far. •..-Experience concludeth nothing universally.'1 If he despaired of wringing her secret from Nature, he never doubted that he held the key to every corner of the human heart. He offers us a theory of man's nature which is at once consistent, fascinating, and outrageously false. Only the greatest of realists could have revealed so much and blinded himself to so much more. You cry angrily — It is false, false to the core ; and yet the still small voice will suggest, But how much of it is really true ? It is poor, immoral stuff ! so you might say in the pulpit, but you know that it probes very deep. It is only the exploded Bentha mite philosophy with its hedonistic calculus tricked out in antique piquancy of phrase ! If you really hold this, if you think that JHobbes's man is nothing _^nore_jthan a utilitarian automaton led by the nose by suburban pleasures and pains, you have no sense of power, of pathos, or of irony. It is only the trick of the cheap cynic, you retort in fine. Yes, it is cynicism ;., but it is not cheap. Nature has made malTirpassionate creature, desirous not of pleasure but of power ; the passions themselves are not simple emotions, but charged with and mastered by the appetite for power ; jionour consisteth only, in the opinion "of power ; the worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price ; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power ; the

1 Hobbes's English Works, iv. 18, ed. Molesworth, 1839.

public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the commonwealth, is that which men com monly call dignity. Leave men to themselves, they struggle : forj3owe£; competition, diffidence, vainglory driving them. Sober half-hours hush with their lucid intervals the tumult of the passions ; even so on earth they bring no beatitude. Care for the future is never banished from thought ; felicity is a continual progress of the desire from one object to another.

' So that in the first place, I put for a general incli nation of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.'1

' For as Prometheus, which interpreted is, the prudent man, was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where an eagle, feeding on his liver, devoured in the day as much as was repaired in the night : so that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity ; and has no repose nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.' 2

Such, then, is the lust and the burden of man. What is the deliverance ? Spinoza found it in philosophy ; the truth shall make you free : but Hobbes was a philosopher who had no faith in truth. Pascal found it in the following of Christ ; but I doubt whether religion ever meant much more

than an engine of political order to Hobbes. Rous seau, whose survey of human nature often strangely and suspiciously resembles that of Hobbes, advo cated — in some moods at least — a return to nature. Rousseau's * nature' was a pig-sty, but Hobbes's state of nature was something far worse than that. Hobbes was never disloyal to intellect, grievously as he affronted its paramount claims ; he was not of those who see virtue in the renunciation of mathe matics, logic, and clothes. Passion-ridden intellect had mastered man in a state of nature ; a passion- wearied intellect might deliver man from it. If man cannot fulfil his desire, he can seek peace and ensue it by the invention of fictions. It is not prudence, but curiosity, that distinguisheth man from beast. He wonders ; he is possessed ; a passionate thought leaps to the utterance ; the word is born ; the idea is fixed ; from henceforth he will boldly conclude universally ; science has come in the train of lan guage. This most noble and profitable invention of speech, ' without which there had been amongst men neither commonwealth nor society, nor contract nor peace^ no more than amongst lions, bears, and wolves,' l is man's proudest triumph over nature. By his own art he fetters himself with his own fictions— the fictions of the tongue. You shall no longer hold that men acquired speech because man was a reason ing animal ; in truth man became capable of science, i.e. reason, because he invented speech. It was not 1 p. 24.

nature which in secular travail brought reason to the birth ; but man saw nature's poverty of inven tion, and boldly substituted his own. He created reason in the interests of peace. Voltaire profanely said that if there were no God it would be necessary to invent one ; convictions of similar cogency drove the Hobbean man to bow his neck to the dictator ship of the neologist. ' The Greeks have but one word, Ao'yos, for both speech and reason ; not that they thought there was no speech without reason, but no reasoning without speech.' l Truth is a neces sity ; but necessary truth is a will-o'-the-wisp. Seekers after truth — how Hobbes despised them, all that deluded race who dreamt of a law whose seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world : all things in heaven and earth doing her homage ! Rather, boldly conclude that truth is not to be sought, but made. Let men agree what is to be truth, and truth it shall be. There is truth and truth abounding when once it is recognized that truth is only of universals, that there is nothing in the world universal but names, and that names are imposed arbitrio hominum. Fiction is not, as people hold, the image or the distortion of the real which it counter feits ; it is the very and only foundation of that reality which is rational. Here is Hobbes's answer to that question which, in its varied phrasing, has never ceased to trouble philosophy. Are there innate ideas ? What is the ultimate criterion of truth ?

Is there a transcendent reason ? What is common sense ? Are there any undemonstrable and indu bitable axioms fundamental to all thought ? How is a synthetic a priori judgement possible ?

The same temper which leads him to stifle thought with language carries him on to substitute definitions for first principles. Prima philosophia — metaphysics in Aristotle's sense — is first a body of definitions. These definitions are our points of departure : we must start by agreeing upon them. For * the light of human minds is perspicuous words, by exact definitions first snuffed and purged from ambiguity'.1 A definition must be held to be satisfactory if it be clear. The master claims a free and absolute right of arbitrary definition. The scholar queries : Is the definition true ? is it adequate ? does it assort with reality ? To whom the master testily replies : You are irrelevant ; your only right is to ask.jtsjt clear ? Unless my definitions are accepted as first principles, science, i.e. a deductive system of conse quences, is impossible, and inference foreclosed. Let me remind you again that agreement on defini tions is the sine qua non of intelligible reasoning ; and then for the sake of peace and lucidity let me beg —nay insist — that you accept my rulrngj^ the use of names. Are they not arbitrary ? Is not "one man's imposition as good as another's ? Mine there fore — at least for purposes of argument — rather better than yours ? Hobbes knew what he was about ;

he was ' rare at definitions ', said the admiring John Aubrey.1 It was because he very clearly saw that in the prerogative of definition lay the sove reignty in philosophy.

But, you say, he must recognize some real, uncon ventional, transcendent standard of truth some where : for otherwise by what right does he dis tinguish between truth and error ? And what is the meaning of the charges ' absurd ' and ' insignificant ' so freely lavished on opinions with which he dis agrees ? I can only reply that his distinctions between truth and falsehood, sense and absurdity, are per fectly consistent with the doctrine I have been expounding. Man's privilege of reason ' is allayed by another : and that is, by the privilege of absurdity ; to which no living creature is subject, but man only. . . . For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere : that there can be nothing so absurd but may be found in the books of philosophers.' 2 ' As men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. . . For words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them ; but they are the money of fools, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever.' 3 .The causes. of this endowment of absurdity are butjvant of definition, want of adherence to definitions.^ want of the power of syllogizing. A glance at Hobbes's relentless application of this fundamental principle

will be sufficient. Good and evil are terms of individual imposition ; by tacit agreement one may say they are, left to a personal interpretation ; there is no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves. But the moral virtues and vices are universal names : they take their definition ex arbitrio hominum, i.e. from the will of the State. ' The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice ; and sometimes also with his tongue.' l The fool might arrive at his conclusion by an easy deduction from the principles of Hobbes. For if he had studied Hobbes's code of nature with ordinary care he would have discovered that the justice of which Leviathan is begotten is carefully emptied of all ethical content. There is indeed a justice, an obligation arising out of contract, which naturally refuses to discuss

its own title ; and there is another justice, the parody of equity, which explains itself with a humorous grin as the fiction of equality playing the peace-maker. You, X, say you're as good as any one else : Y says he 's quite your match, and he'll take you on : permit me to assume them for purposes of codification a hypo thesis of universal equality, and to refer you to the golden rule for your future behaviour !

At length man's pride and passions compel him to submit himself to government. Leviathan is set on his feet ; he is the king of the proud ; but his feet are of clay ; he too is a fiction. This time

Hobbes resorts to the lawyers, borrows from them their mystico-legal fiction of the persona moralis, the corporation, and sends the mystical elements in it to the right about. ' It is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one : . . . and unity cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.' * The sove- reign is the soul, the person, the representative, the will, the conscience of the commonwealth ; i.e. the sovereign is the commonwealth in that fictional sense which alone is truth in science and in practice. Once again there is no such thing as objective right : therefore we must invent a substitute for it by establishing a sovereign who shall declare what shall be right for us. On this point Hobbes is unmistak ably emphatic.

' The law is all the right reason we have, and (though he, as often as it disagreeth with his own reason, deny it) is the infallible rule of moral good ness. The reason whereof is this, that because neither mine nor the Bishop's reason is right reason fit to be a rule of our moral actions, we have there fore set up over ourselves a sovereign governor, and agreed that his laws shall be unto us, whatsoever they be, in the place of right reason, to dictate to us what is really good. In the same manner as men in playing turn up trump, and as in playing their game their morality consist eth in not renouncing, so

in our civil conversation our morality is all contained in not disobeying of the laws.' l — Hobbes' s debate with Dr. Bramhall, Bishop of Deny.

' For, but give the authority of defining punish ments to any man whatsoever, and let that man define them, and right reason has defined them, suppose the definition be both made, and made known before the offence committed. For such authority is to trump in card-playing, save that in matter of government, when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps.' 2 — A Dialogue of the Common Laws.

It is idle to qualify or defend such a political philosophy : it is rotten at the core. It is valueless save in so far as it stimulates to refutation. We may be content to leave it as a precious privilege to the lawyers, who need definitions and have no concern with morality. And yet no thinker on politics has ever probed its fundamental conceptions more thoroughly f and I say it advisedly, if you would think clearly of rights and duties, sovereignty and " law, you must begin with the criticism of Hobbes. For any philosophy which is worth the name must spring out of scepticism ; and every system of philosophy which is worth serious attention must achieve the conquest of scepticism. It is only a very ; botcher in philosophy or a very genial personage who can really rest content with a merely sceptical attitude. Hobbes was no Carneades of riotous

dialectic, no Montaigne of cheerful and humorous resignation. His logic plunged him into the abyss of scepticism ; but the fierce dogmatism of his nature revolted against it. David Hume imagined that it was left for him to send philosophy to its euthanasia ; but in truth Hobbes had seen it all, the whole sceptic's

progress — seen it, and travelled it, and loathed it long ago.

Hobbes clutched at mathematics as the dogma tist's last straw. Spite of the wreck of objective ideals, what might not be effected with matter and motion ! Here, if anywhere, certainty might be found ; here reason, baffled and disillusioned, might find a punctum stans ; a fulcrum to explain the universe.

Hobbes thought in an atmosphere of dualism- yet Hobbes was a resolute opponent of dualism. From 1637, the date of the Discours, the relation between matter and mind, body and soul, was a cardinal — the cardinal problem. Descartes had awarded to each substance co-ordinate, independent, absolute rights. The future business of Cartesianism was to find a trait d'union — an explanation for a rela tion in fact which had been demonstrated in theory inconceivable.

At first blush one might be inclined to say Hobbes remained untouched by the new method. Starting a basis of empiricism he developed a materialistic

philosophy in perfect independence of the current. of idealisticthought which was flowing so stronplv on the Continent. It would be a mistaken view. Hobbes is powerfully influenced by Descartes. Descartes prescribes for him his method — not Gas- sendi or Bacon. But with Descartes' dualism he will not away. He suspected Descartes of palter- ing with philosophy to appeasethe Jesuits — his philosophy must find a cornerforjthe mysteries of theTCathohc faith, e.g. transubstantiation, pro salute animae ; and was a system to be received which fell hopelessly apart in the middle, and which demanded a miracle to restore a unity which a philosophy worthy of the name was bound to demonstrate impossible ?

A^svstem — or philosophy — must be coJae^eirL at any price ; a philosopher, whose business it was to define, should see to that : words are wise men's counters, and the philosopher must play to win ; coherence, not comprehension, is with JHobbes the touchstone of philosophy, the test of truth. To Hobbes, rationalism is the fundamental postulate ; and a rational universe must be deduced from a single and simple principle. Dualism was the consecration of the irrational.

But Hobbes deals in back blows — he does not meet the dualist face to face ; he refuses to see eve to eye with him ; the problem shall be eluded, the position turned, in an emergency the question at issue begged. Sensation need offer no difficulties : sensation is only motion ; it can only be caused by

motion, it is only a form, a manifestation of motion. Fancy, memory, comparison, judgement, are really carried with sense — ' sense hath necessarily some memory adhering to it.' x

And reason — pure intellection — the faculty of science — surely here we must appeal to another source (cf. Descartes and Gassendi), surely we have passed into another realm. Hobbes emphatically assures us that it is this reason, this capacity for general hypothetical reason, this science or sapience, which marks man off from the brutes. The distinction between science and experience, sapience and pru dence, is fundamental in his philosophy. And yet if we look more narrowly we shall find this marvellous endowment of man is really the child of language — that most noble and profitable invention. This bald paradox is a masterpiece of tactics. Speech is ushered in with the fanfaronade, and lo ! reason is dis covered clinging to her train. Instinct says, reason begets speech ; paradox in verts, speech begets reason.

Man acquires speech because he is reasonable)(man becomes capable of science because he has invented, speech. A wonderful hysteron prater on.

Hobbes derives some account from his audacity.

1. We easily understand how error is possible- no need of tedious discussion — error dogs the heels of language.

2. Seeing that thought (science) depends on lan guage, it is evident that to clarify thought we must

language— re-definition the true_ task of h.

In my necessarily harsh review I may have seemed to have found no answer to my opening question. Does it not involve a petitio principii ? Is he great after all ?' I am content to rest the issue on one test alone — the test of style. I am adopting no superficial test, when I boldly affirm that every great thinker reveals his greatness in his style. It is quite possible — unhappily common — to cultivate style without thought ; it is absolutely impossible to think really, deeply, passionately, without forging a style. Now Hobbes's style is something quite unique in our literature. Of course I don't mean it stands out of the seventeenth century ; to read a paragraph is to fix its date. But no other seven teenth-century writer has a style like it : it is inimitable. It would be childish to measure it with the incommensurable ; to pit it against the fluent magnificence of Milton or the quaint and unexpected beauties of Sir Thomas Browne. But it is fair to try Hobbes's English by the touchstone of Bacon's. Those critics who deny Bacon's title to a primacy in philosophy are generally ready enough to acknow ledge his high position as a writer. And Bacon and Hobbes are writers of the same order. They are both sententious ; they are both grave and didactic ; they both wield the weapons of imagery, apophthegm, and epigram ; they are both — let us admit it — laboured stylists. It is, I think, highly probable that Hobbes

learnt something of literary craftsmanship from Bacon in those Gorhambury contemplations. But Hobbes's writing is just as decisively superior to Bacon's, as his philosophy. Bacon aimed at conceal ing the poverty of his thought by the adornment of his style : he wrote for ostentation. When that solemn humbug, that bourgeois Machiavel, took up his pen to edify mankind, he first opened his com monplace books, stuffed with assorted anecdotes, quotations, conceits, and mucrones verborum, and then with an eye to the anthology, proceeded to set down ' what oft was thought, but ne'er so well expressed '.

It must be admitted it reads remarkably well. The sentences are brave and brief at first inspection : you mistake terseness of language for condensation of thought. But read again. Many examples of this can be found in such an essay as ' Of Study '. Now turn to Hobbes ; but before you do so, open Aubrey and learn the open secret of his style.

' He was never idle ; his thoughts were always working.' 1

' He sayd that he sometimes would sett his thoughts upon researching and contemplating, always with this rule, that he very much and deeply considered one thing at a time (scilicet a weeke or sometimes a fortnight).' 2

' He walked much and contemplated, and he had in the head of his staff e a pen and inke-horne, carried

always a note booke in his pocket, and as soon as a thought darted, he presently entred it into his booke, or otherwise he might perhaps have lost it. ... Thus that book (the Leviathan) was made.'1

In Hobbes the clauses are clean, the sentences jolt, the argument is inevitable. Bacon wrote to display his wit : Hobbes to convince and confute. Bacon invented epigram to coax the public ear ; Hobbes found his epigram after he had crystallized his thought. In sum, the difference between the 1 ? styles of Bacon and Hobbes is to be measured by the difference between ostentation and passionate thought. We can compare Hobbes's own defence of his style and method.

' There is nothing I distrust more than my elocu tion, which nevertheless I am confident, excepting the mischances of the press, is not obscure. That I have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets, orators, and philosophers, contrary to the custom of late time, (whether I have done well or ill in it,) proceedeth from my judgement, grounded on many reasons. For first, all truth of doctrine dependeth either upon reason, or upon Scripture ; both which give credit to many, but never receive it from any writer. Secondly, the matters in question are not of fact, but of right, wherein there is no place for witnesses. There is scarce any of those old writers that contradicteth not sometimes both him-

self and others ; which makes their testimonies insufficient. Fourthly, such opinions as are taken only upon credit of antiquity, are not intrinsically the judgement of those that cite them, but words that pass, like gaping, from mouth to mouth. Fifthly, it is many times with a fraudulent design that men stick their corrupt doctrine with the cloves of other men's wit. Sixthly, I find not that the ancients they cite, took it for an ornament, to do the like with those that wrote before them. Seventhly, it is an argument of indigestion, when Greek and Latin sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to do, unchanged. Lastly, though I reverence those men of ancient time, that either have written truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it out ourselves ; yet to the antiquity itself I think nothing due. For if we will reverence the age, the present is the oldest. If the antiquity of the writer, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such honour is given, were more ancient when they wrote, than I am that am writing. But if it be well con sidered, the praise of ancient authors proceeds not from the reverence of the dead, but from the com petition, and mutual envy of the living.' l

Aubrey has more to tell us. For instance, about his reading :

' He had read much, if one considers his long life ; but his contemplation was much more than his

reading. He was wont to say that if he had read as much as other men, he should have knowne no more than other men.' l

About his love of ' ingeniose conversation ' :

c I have heard him say, that at his lord's house in the country there was a good library, and bookes enough for him, and that his lordship stored the library with what bookes he thought fitt to be bought ; but he sayd, the want of learned conversa tion was a very great inconvenience, and that though he conceived he could order his thinking as well perhaps as another man, yet he found a great defect.' 2

Studying Hobbes as we do in historical manuals of philosophy, with their extracted systems, we usually fail to recognize how strongly the blood of the. controversialist ran in his veins. Yet the Leviathan is first and foremost a controversial episode — a fighting work. Hobbes himself professed regret that his thoughts for those ten years of civil war were so unhinged from the mathematics, but he certainly entered into the quarrel with alacrity. His interests were pre-eminently occupied with ecclesi astical problems. Born in 1588, an Oxford student at the time of the Gunpowder Plot, an indignant witness of the struggle of that age between religion and science, like every honest Englishman he pursued Pope and Jesuit with an undying hate. For the aversion to Rome and the Roman claims there

was ample justification. By his Bull of Deposition in 1570 Pope Pius V had challenged the struggle, and rendered the position of English Catholics untenable. From a respected if prohibited faith they became recusants : from recusants, traitors. It was the Papal policy and its indefatigable agents the Jesuits which were to blame. What peace was possible with men who repudiated moral obligations, who hesitated at no crime ad maiorem Dei gloriam ? The same dishonesty which covered their actions and their name with infamy for succeeding gene rations, rendered their apologetic literature the poorest trash and the most immoral stuff that was ever justly consigned to oblivion. Bellarmine and Baronius once were names to conjure with : does any one respect them now ? Their only merit is that they called for answer — and some of the answers are among the most precious treasures of English Theology. Hobbes too must break a lance with Bellarmine in the Leviathan. And Hobbes was not the least vigorous or the worst equipped of the English champions.

For indeed Hobbes deserves a place among the Masters in English Theology. Strange company, it may seem. But if Hobbes be read in connexion with the line of great English apologists — apologists for Protestantism and apologists for Anglicanism, it will at once be evident to any unprejudiced mind that the lines of defence and attack on which the Fathers of Anglicanism — Jewel, Hooker, Andrewes,

Laud, Chilling worth, Jeremy Taylor — conducted the debate were adopted with a thoroughness all his own by Hobbes. He dotted the i's and crossed the t's of the divines ; sharpened their logic, sounded their inferences, and appended a few corollaries from which they themselves might have shrunk. The theory of a national and autonomous Church outlined by Jewel and compendiously stated by Hooker (' the prince has power to change the public face of religion '), hardly allowed of clearer definition in Hobbes's brief chapter1 on the identity of Church and Commonwealth and the consequences flowing therefrom.

Again, the distinction between the necessary and the variable, fundamentals and non-fundamentals, articles of faith and matters of opinion, was the real principle of the Reformation. For the constant effort of the Roman Church was to extend the list of matters which were de fide, and to minimize the variable element as far as possible. So that, when he asserts and proves that the unum necessarimn, the only article of faith, which the Scripture maketh necessary to salvation, is this, that Jesus is the Christ, Hobbes is taking the Anglican position occupied for instance by Chillingworth and Jeremy Taylor. Not that he ever dreamt, as they did, of allowing the antithesis to become the premiss of religious freedom. With him — as with Laud — it drove to an opposite conclusion. If a practice, an

opinion, is non-essential, then it is indifferent ; if indifferent, then the commonwealth, i.e. the sove reign, must decide. What the rule was did not matter, all that mattered was that a rule there should be.

Once again, Anglican polemics had been con strained to welcome the aid of philology against controversialists who — let us charitably assume in ignorance of Greek — employed texts which were forgeries, and emended those which were not. Jeremy Taylor was more than doubtful as to the value of patristic testimony, and could not away with the Athanasian Creed.

Hobbes goes so far as to subject the whole canon of Scripture to a critical examination, which in its boldness anticipates the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus of Spinoza.

And yet the Church of England always viewed this self-constituted ally with something more than suspicion. His Erastianism was of a type which only Selden and a few lawyers could appreciate. Honest Baillie spoke of him as Hobbes the Atheist : there were those who hinted darkly that he was no other than Antichrist. It is true his views on the Trinity were of a Sabellian complexion ; and in one famous passage he was incautious enough to make Moses one of the three persons thereof. In Hobbes's time Legate and Wightman had been burnt for less. He himself would have made an unwilling martyr. ' There was a report (and surely true),'

says Aubrey, ' that in Parliament, not long after the king was settled, (in fact it was 1668), some of the bishops made a motion to have the good old gentleman burnt for a heretique.' l I don't know that they actually went as far as that, whatever they thought ; but certain it is they inquired into his books, that the University of Cambridge in 1669 compelled one Daniel Scargill, Fellow of Corpus Christi, to recant his Hobbism,2 and that Hobbes himself was grievously alarmed. And with some justice : for despite his eloquent legal defence, I doubt whether the common lawyers would have been deterred from issuing the writ de haeretico comburendo.

Happily the only result was to send up the price of his books — this from the good Pepys, who tried to buy them. What did Pepys think of them ?

Hobbes may well have been uncomfortable : he knew, better probably than even the bishops, how A thoroughly he deserved to be burnt. With sophistry \ and sense, with satire and suggestion, he had been fighting, single-handed, in the cause of the lay f intellect. ' When Mr. T. Hobbes was sick in France ; the divines came to him and tormented him (both Roman Catholic, Church of England, and Geneva). Sayd he to them, "Let me alone or else I will detect all your cheates from Aaron to yourselves." ' 3 The

threatened attack — vivacious, detailed, and precise — was delivered in the last two books of the Leviathan. How thorough the assault was you may judge for yourselves if you will read them ; the tone you may estimate from a few illustrations, which may perhaps encourage you to read further.1

A good-natured critic will refuse to see in Hobbes anything more than the sturdy Protestant, the stalwart champion of national religion, denouncing with equal emphasis the frauds of priestcraft and the irresponsibility of private judgement. His friends certainly believed that ' the good old gentle man ' was a sound Christian at heart. He may have been : it is more evident that he was an Erastian. Many of us —

most of us in fact — are Erastians with certain limitations : Hobbes was an Erastian without limitations. It is customary to count him among the pioneers of Natural Religion and Rational Theology. For such a view I can find no evidence. Natural Law is indeed the law of reason^^found, out by reason : but National Religiori te not the re ligion of reason. Nature indeed plants the seeds of religion — fear and ignorance ; kingcraft and priest craft water and tend it. The religion of"' reason is the religion of the State — arid the State bids us captivate our reason. ' It is with the mysteries of our religion as with wholesome pills for the .sick :

1 Cf. on Inspiration, pp. 312-14; on Hell, p. 351 ; on the Soul, p. 526; on the Hot-houses of Vain Philosophy, p. 518; 011 Aristotelity and Theology, pp. 523-4; on the Universities, p. 523. Cf. his sketch of the origin and history of Universities, p. 523.

which swallowed whole have the virtue to cure ; but chewed are for the most part cast up again without effect.'1

Hobbes had his bitter jest with his contemporaries, and the whirligig of time has had its revenges. He has suffered much from his opponents, more from his defenders, most from his plagiarists. Oxford once burnt the Leviathan : she now prescribes it to her students ; but the prescribed portion is very limited, and there is no reason to suppose that she has ever .understood him. It was, after all, a nemesis well deseWed. A great partisan by nature, Hobbes became by the sheer force of his fierce, concentrated intellect a master builder in philosophy. The stimulus of opposition roused him to think. He hated error, and therefore, to confute it, he shoul dered/his way into the very sanctuary of truth. But his hands were not clean, nor his spirit pure ; patient research and absolute devotion were not in his nature to give ; he never felt the ' bright shoots of everlastingness ', and resolutely closed his eyes to the high vision. With all his intellectual power he is of the earth earthy ; at best the Lydian stone of philosophy, and 'rare at definitions '.2

Printed for ANDREW C R o o K E , at the Green Dragon in St. Pauls Church-yard, 165-1.

YOUR most worthy Brother Mr Sidney Godolphin, when he lived, was pleas'd to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with reall testi monies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the greater for the worthinesse of his person. For there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society, or private Friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to your selfe, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my discourse of Common-wealth. I know not how the, world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too much Authority, 'tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the Civill Power, should not be by the Civill Power condemned ; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that Power too great. Besides, -I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there,) offending none, I think, but those without, or such within (if there be any such) as favour them. That which perhaps may most

offend, are certain Texts of Holy Scripture, alledged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by others. But I have

done it with due submission, and also (in order to my .. iHect) necessarily ; for they are the Outworks of the TV-.'T»/, from whence they impugne the Civill Power. . notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decryed, you may be pleased to excuse your selfe, and say I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I say, that I honoured your Brother, and honour you, and have presum'd on that, to assume the Title (without your knowledge) of being, as I am,

obedient servant, Paris. Aprill Jf. 1651. THO. HOBBES.

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6. O/ #&0 interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions,

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46. Of Darknesse from Vain Philosophy, and Fabulous

47. Of the Benefit proceeding from such Darknesse ; and,

[These errata have been corrected in the text of this reprint.]

NATURE (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the begining whereof is in some principall part within ; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring ; and the Nerves, but so many Strings ; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer ? Art goes yet further, imitating that

Ration all and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man ; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended ; and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body ; The Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execu tion, artificiall Joynts ; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seate of the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty) are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall ; The Wealth and Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength ; Salus Populi (the peoples safety) its Businesse ; Counsellors, by whom all things needful! for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory ; Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will ; Concord, Health ; Sedition, Sicknesse ; and Civill war, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made, se1*t<jy°jether, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.

To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will I>] consider

First, the Matter thereof, and the Artificer ; both

which is Man. Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made ;

what are the Rights and just Power or Authority

of a Soveraigne ; and what it is that preserveth

Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-wealth^ Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, That Wisedome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men. Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to shew what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains ; and that is, Nosce teipsum, Read thy self : which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors ; or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards their betters ; But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, feare, &c, and upon what grounds ; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all men, desire, feare, hope, &c ; not the similitude of the objects of the -Passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, &c : for these the constitu tion individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of rja^ns heart, blotted and con founded as they a^e^ ^th dissembling, lying, counter feiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts. And though by mens actions wee

do discover their designe sometimes ; yet to do it with out comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to decypher without a key,

and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence ; as he that reads, is himself a good or evil man. But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him onely with his acquaintance, ! which are but few. He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man ; but Man-kind : which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any Language, or Science ; yet, when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.

CONCERNING the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly, and afterwards in Trayne, or depen- dance upon one another. Singly, they are every one a Representation or Apparence, of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us ; which is commonly called an Object. Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body ; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.

The Originall of them all, is that which we call SENSE ; (For there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that originall.

To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand ; and I have else where written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of Sense, is the Extern all Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch ; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling : which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and^rnem- br^nes of the body, continued inwards to the Bra^ and Beatt, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the hgart, to deliver it self : which endeavour because Outmkd, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, ^L_Jancy,_\s that which men call Sense ; and consisteth, as to tneTEye] in a Light, or Colowrfjj>ured ; To the Eare, in a Sound ; To the Nostrill, in an Odour ; To the Tongue, and Palat, in a Savour ; And to the rest of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities, as we discern by Feeling. All which qualities called Sensible, are in the

^object that causeth them, but so many several motions *

NeifneFm"us that are~pressed, are they any thing else, but divers motions ; (for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But their apparence to us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light ; and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne ; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though

=» unobserved action. For if those Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them, they

[4] could not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes by reflection, wee see they are ; where we know the thing we see, is in one place ; the apparence, in another. And though at some certain distance,

the reall, and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us ; Yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that Sense in all cases^ is nothing els but originall f aricy^ cjiis2t(^^j^ve_^djjb^the_pressure, jthat JsTby the motjpn^jp^externail things^apon ourTTyes, l^Fel>rangi)fi^

" But fheTTiilosophy-schobles, through all the Univer sities of Christendome, grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine ; and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a visible species (in English) a visible shew, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen ; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing. And for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an Audible species, that is, an Audible aspect, or Audible being seen ; which entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the cause of Understanding also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen ; which comming into the Under standing, makes us Understand. I say not this, as disap proving the use of Universities : but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must let you see on aL1 occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them ; amongst which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.

THAT when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves : and because they find themselves sub ject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord ; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the Schooles say, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them ; ascribing appetite and Knowledge of what is good for their conservation, (which is more than man has) to things inanimate, absurdly.

When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally ; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it : And as wee see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling for a long time after ; so also it happeneth in that [5l motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latjnes call Imagination, from the image made in seeing ; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy ; which signifies apparence, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothmg_but decaying sense ; and is found in rrrerrpaTicr manyotlier living Creatures, aswell sleeping, as waking.

The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense ; but an oBscurml "~^

such manner, as the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres ; which starrs do no less exercise their vertue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night. But because amongst manyv stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other organs receive from externall bodies, the predominant onely is sensible ; therefore the lighF^f the ~5uh being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the starrs. And

any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain ; yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the^Jmagination of the pastjsobscured^and made weak ; arthevoyce of a man ^is'ln^fnTliioyseot trie dayT From whence it followeth, that the longejLlhe time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object, theweaker is the Imagination? For^fhe c5ntmuall change of mans body, destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved : So that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme, and without distinction of the smaller parts ; and as Voyces grow weak, and inarticu late : so also after great distance of time, our imagina tion of the Past is weak ; and wee lose (for example) of Cities wee have seen, many particular Streets ; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances. This decaying sense, when wee would express the thing it self, (I mean fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said before : But when we would express the decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. Memory. So that J[maginationa^__MemQnL are^but one thing, which for divers Considerations hath divers "name?: - Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience. Againe, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times ; The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is simple Imagination ; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is Compounded ; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man com-

poundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man ; as when a man imagins himself e a Hercules, or an Alexander, (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of Romants) it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction of thelnind. There be also other Imagina- t6! tions that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression made in sense : As from gazing upon the Sun, the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a long time after ; and from being long and vehe mently attent upon Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake) have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes : which kind of Fancy hath no particular name ; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into mens discourse.

The imaginations of them that sleep, are those_we call Dreams. Dreams. And these also (as all other Imaginations) have Been Hefore, either totally, or by parcells in the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination ; and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agita tion of the inward parts of mans body ; which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion ; whereby the Imaginations there for merly made, appeare as if a man were waking ; saving that the Organs of Sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must needs be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to passe, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming. For my part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do notl often, nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking ; nor remember j so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at J other times ; And

because waking I often observe the i absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities

of my waking Thoughts ; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not ; though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.

And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the Body ; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams. And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare, and raiseth the thought and Image of some fearfull object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the Brain being reciprocal! :) And that as Anger causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake ; so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth Anger, and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy. In the same manner ; as naturall kindness, when we are awake causeth desire ; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body ; so also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shewn. In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations ; The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end ; and when we Dream, at another.

The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his [7] waking thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe Appan- not that we have slept : which is easie to happen to a man Visions *u^ °^ fearfull thoughts ; and whose conscience is much troubled ; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting oft his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh pains, and industriously layes himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream. We read of Marcus Brutus, (one that had his life given him by Julius Ccesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,) how at Philippi, the night before he gave battell to Augustus Ccesar, hee saw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related by Historians as a Vision : but considering che circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short Dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which

most affrighted him ; which feare, as by degrees it made him wake ; so also it must needs make the Apparition by degrees to vanish : And having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Vision. And this is no very rare Acci dent : for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous, and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies ; and believe they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking in Church-yards ; whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons, as make use of such superstitious feare, to passe disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt. From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other sfrpng^Paricies/ From' Vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past," tTTat worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, Nymphs, and the like ; and now adayes the opinion that rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins ; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any reall power ; but yet that they are justly punished, for the false belie fe they have, that they can do such mischief e, joyned with their purpose to do it if they can : their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or Science. And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in

credit the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions of Ghostly men. Never thelesse, there is no doubt, but God can make unnaturall Apparitions : But that he does it so often, as men need to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evill men under pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue ; It is the part of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things depending

[8] thereon, by which, crafty ambitious persors abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.

And this ought to be the work of the Schooles : but they rather nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are), what they receive, they teach : some saying, that Imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause : Others that they rise most commonly from the Will ; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by God ; and Evill thoughts by the Divell : or that Good thoughts are powred (infused) into a man, by God, and Evill ones by the Divell. Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to the Common -sense ; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy, and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.

Under- The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other standing, creature indued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes, is that we generally call Understanding ; and is common to Man and Beast. For a dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of his Master ; and so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is the Under standing not onely his will ; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech : And of this kinde of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.

Of the Consequence or TRAYNE of Imaginations.

BY Consequence, or TRAYNE of Thoughts, I understand that succession of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after, is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every Thought sue-

ceeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts ; so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this. All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense : And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after Sense : In so much as the former comming again to take place, and be predominant, the later followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, some times another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time, thatjn the Imagining of any

thing, there is.no certainty [9] what we shall Imagine next ; Onely this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is Tmyne of of two sorts. The first is Unguided, without Designe, and Thoughts inconstant ; Wherein there is no Passionate Thought, tt to govern ariH direct those that follow, to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion : In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem imperti nent one to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thoughts of men, that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing ; though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony ; as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to™ any man; or in tune, to one that could not • play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a Discourse of our present civill warre, what could seem more imperti nent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny ? Yet the Coherence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies ; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again

the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason : and thence easily followed that malicious question ; and all this in a moment of time ; for Thought is quick.

Tmyne of The second is more constant ; as being regulated by Thoughts some desire, and designe. For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is strong, and per manent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return : so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at ; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean ; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the End, by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this praecept, which is now worne out, Respice finem ; this is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds ; One, when of an effect imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced ; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely ; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In summe, the Discourse of the Mind, when it is governed by designe, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Inven- [10] tion. which the Latines call Sagacitas, and Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past ; or of the effects, of some present or past cause. Some times a man seeks what he hath lost ; and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find

where, and when he had it ; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find

what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to mind : the Remem- Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-conning bl/ance- of our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof he is to seek ; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a Jewell ; or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent ; or as a man should run over the Alphabet, to start a rime.

Sometime a man desires to know the event of an Prudence. action ; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another ; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what wil become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like Crime before ; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts is called Foresight, and Prudence, or Providence ; and sometimes Wisdome ; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain ; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another ; by so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the seldomer faile him. The Present onely has a being in Nature ; things Past have a being in the Memory onely, but things to come have no being at all ; the Future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past, to the actions that are Present ; which with most certainty is done by him that has most Experience ; but not with certainty enough. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation ; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser ; and the best

guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at : for he hath most Signes to guesse by. Signes. A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent ; and contrarily, the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been observed, before : And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future time ; and consequently is the most prudent : And so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit : though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth L11] man from beast. There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

Conjee- As Prudence is a Prtesumtion of the Future, con- ture of the tracted from the Experience of time Past : So there is time past. a praesumtion of things Past taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civil warre, and then to ruine ; upon the sight of the ruines of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same incertainty almost with the conjecture of the Future ; both being grounded onely upon Experience.

There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remem ber, naturally planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and

encreased by study and industry ; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline ; and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion ; though by the help of Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of any thing we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite magnitude ; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to con ceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named ; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of God is used, not to make us conceive him ; (for he is Incomprehensible ; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable ;) but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts ; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place ; and indued with some deter minate magnitude ; and which may be divided into parts ; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time ; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once : For none of these things ever have, or can be incident to Sense ; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all,) from deceived Philoso phers, and deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen.

THE Invention of Printing, though ingenious, com- Originall pared with the invention of Letters, is no great matter. °f Speech. But who was the first that found the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phoenicia. A profitable Invention lor continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth ; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observa tion of the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech ; whereby to make as many

differences of characters, to remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH, consisting of Names or Appellations, and their Connexion ; whereby men register their Thoughts ; recall them when they are past ; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation ; without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author of Speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight ; For the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion ; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood ; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for ; though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations ; much less the names of Words and Speech, as Generally Special!, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which are usefull ; and least of all, of Entity, Inten- tionality, Quiddity, and other insignificant words of the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them ; and in tract of time grew every where more copious.

The use of Speech. The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, jnto Verbal ; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words ; arfd that for two commodities ;

whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences of [13] our Thoughts ; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter ; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called Signes. Speciall uses of Speech are these ; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past ; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect : which in summe, is acquir ing of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained ; which is, to Counsell, and Teach . one another. Thirdly, to make_known~To7 others our wills, and purposes, that we^may have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent A buses of Abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong, Speech. by the inconstancy of the signification of their words ; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never conceived ; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically ; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for ; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another : for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teefh, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern ; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the Connexion of them.

Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely Names thing ; as Peter, John, This man, this Tree : and some Proper &• are Common to many things ; as Man, Horse, Tree ; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things ; in respect of all

Uni- which together, it is called an Universall ; there being

versall. nothing in the world Universall but Names ; for the

things named, are every one of them Individuall and

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident : And wheras a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing onely ; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent ; the larger comprehending the less large : and some again of equall extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is of larger signification than the word Man, and compre- hendeth it ; and the names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually one another. [14! But here wee must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely Word ; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For all these words, Hee that in his .actions observeth the Lawes of his Country, make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the conse quences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle ; but onely to this, that the sides were

straight, and the angles three ; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle ; will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever ; and register his invention in these generall termes, Every triangle hath its three angles equall to two right angles. And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred, as an Universall rule ; and discharges our mentall reckoning, of time and place ; and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first ; and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and places.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as in Numbring. A naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order of numerall words, as one, two, and three, may observe every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one ; but can never know what houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use ; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of ; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himselfe, and not know when he has done : Much lesse will he be able to adde, and substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers ; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of

man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Conse quence, or Affirmation ; as thus, A man is a living creature ; or thus, if he be a man, he is a living creature, If the later name Living creature, signifie all that the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is true ; otherwise false. For True and False [15] are attributes of Speech, not of Things. And where Speech is not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood. Errour there may be, as when wee expect that which

shall not be ; or suspect what has not been : but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth. Necessity Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of Defini- of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for ; and to place it accordingly ; or else he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird inlime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words ; which settling of significations, they call Definitions ; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true Knowledge, to examine the Defini tions of former Authors ; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down ; or to make them himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply them selves, according as the reckoning proceeds ; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning ; in which lyes the foundation of their errours. From whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little summs into a greater, without considering whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not ; and at last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves ; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes ; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech ; which is the Acquisition of Science : And in wrong, or no Definitions, lyes the first abuse ; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets ; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the con dition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense

and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre : and as men abound in copiousnesse of language ; so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them : but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero., or a Thomas., or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

Subject to Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be Subject to considered in an account ; and be added one to another Names. to make a summe ; or substracted one from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts [16] of mony Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio : and that which we in bills or books of account call Items, they called Nomina ; that is, Names : and thence it seems to proceed, that

they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word Aoyos, for both Speech and Reason ; not that they thought there was no Speech without Reason ; but no Reasoning without Speech : And the act of reasoning they called Syllogisme ; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for divers accidents ; their names are (to shew that diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to foure generall heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body ; as living, sensible, rationall, hot, cold, moved, quiet ; with all which names the word Matter, or Body is under stood ; all such, being names of Matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality, which we conceive to be in it ; as for being moved, for being so long, for being hot, &c ; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe, by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which we consider ; and for living put into the account life ; for moved, motion ; for hot, heat ; for long, length, and the like : And all such Names, are the names of the

accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another. These are called names Abstract ; because severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction : as when any thing is Seen by us, we reckon not the thing it selfe ; but the sight, the Colour, the Idea of it in the fancy : and when any thing is heard, wee reckon it not ; but the hearing, or sound onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the Eare : and such are names of fancies.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give

names, to Names themselves, and to Speeches : For,

generally universall, speciall, czquivocall, are names of

Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation^ Commandement,

Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other

such, are names of Speeches. And this is all the variety

Use Of of Names Positive ; which are put to mark somewhat

Names which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of

Positive, man, as Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be ; or

of bodies, the Properties that are, or may be feigned to

Negative There be also other Names, called Negative ; which

Names are notes to signifie that a word is not the name of the

with their thing in question ; as these words Nothing, no man,

infinite, indocible, three want foure, and the like ; which

are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of

reckoning ; and call to mind our past cogitations, though

they be not names of any thing ; because they make us

refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.

Words All other Names, are but insignificant sounds ; and

insig- [17] those of two sorts. One, when they are new, and yet

mficant. their meaning not explained by Definition ; whereof

there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men,

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent ; as this name, an incorporeall body, or (which is all one) an incorporeall substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signifie

nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word round quadrangle signifies nothing ; but is a meere sound. So likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up and down ; the words In-powred vertue, In-blown vertue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a round quad- rangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senslesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verbe often ; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.

When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath Under- those thoughts which the words of that Speech, and their standing. connexion, were ordained and constituted to signifie ; Then he is said to understand it : Understanding being nothing else, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universall, there can be no Understanding ; though many think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aver sions, and Passions of mans mind ; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the Passions.

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which incon- please, and displease us, because all men be not alike slant affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all names- times, are in the common discourses of men, of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions ; and all our affections are but con ceptions ; when we conceive the same things differently, we can harldy

avoyd different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same ; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words ; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the

nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker ; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices ; For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth feare ; and one cruelty, what another justice ; one prodigality, what another magnanimity ; and one gravity, what another stupidicy, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech : but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy ; which the other do not.

Reason WHEN a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing else but what it is. conceive a summe totall, from Addition of parcels ; or conceive a Remainder, from Substraction of one summe from another : which (if it be done by Words,) is con ceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole ; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and Substracting, men name other operations, as Multi plying and Dividing ; yet they are the same ; for Multi plication, is but Adding together of things equall ; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as Arith meticians teach to adde and substract in numbers ; so the Geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and superficiall,) angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftnesse, force, power, and the like ; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences of words ; adding together two Names, to make an Affirmation ; and two Affirmations, to make a Syllogisme ; and many Syllogismes to make a Demonstration ; and from the summe, or Conclusion of a Syllogisme, they substract one Proposition, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, adde together Factions, to find mens duties ; and Lawyers, Lawes, and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men.

In summe, in what matter soever there is place for addition and substraction, there also is place for Reason ; and where these have no place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say deter- Reason mine,) what that is, which is meant by this word Reason, defined. when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substractingf of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts ; I say marking them, when we reckon~by our selves ; and signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.

And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Right Professors themselves may often erre, and cast up false ; Reaso so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, where most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions ; Not but that Reason it selfe is alwayes ±^ight Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art : "But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of x men, makes the certaintie ; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therfore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their [19] own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of

some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature ; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever : And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge ; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies : bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.

The use of The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the Reason, summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names ; but to begin at these ; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum ; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account ; nor what it is he payes for ; he advantages himself no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trust ing to every of the accountants skill and honesty : so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour ; and cuJes not know any thing ; but onely beleeveth.

Of Error When a man reckons without the use of words, which and Ab- may be done in particular things, (as when upon the surdity. sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it ;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not ; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR ; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in Words 1; of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false ; though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senslesse Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come ; of which, though it were not past, or not to come ; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, Insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quad rangle ; or accidents of Bread in Cheese ; or Immateriall Substances ; or of A free Subject ; A free-Will ; or any

Free, but free from being hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour ; but that his words were without meaning ; that is to say, Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man [20] did excel!" all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I adde this other degree of the same excel lence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes to general! Rules, called Theor ernes, or Aphorismes ; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in number ; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or

substracted from another.

But this priviledge, is allayed by another ; and that is, by the priviledge of Absurdity ; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere ; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use ; which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry ; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.

The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the Causes of want of Method ; in that they begin not their Ratiocination absurditie. from Definitions ; that is, from settled significations of l' their words : as if they could cast account, without know ing the value of the numerall words, one, two, and three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter ;) these considerations being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore

The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of bodies, to accidents ; or of accidents, to bodies ; As they do, that say, Faith is infused, or inspired ; when nothing can be powred, or breathed into any thing, but body ; and that, extension is body ; that phantasmes are spirits, &c.

3. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of bodies without us, to the accidents of our own bodies ; as they do that say, the colour is in the body ; the sound is in the ay re, &c.

4- The fourth, to the giving of the names of bodies, to names, or speeches ; as they do that say, that there be things universall ; that a living creature is Genus, or a generall thing, &c.

5. The fifth, to the giving of the names of accidents, to names and speeches ; as they do that say, the nature of a thing is its definition ; a mans command is his will ; and the like.

6. The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, The Proverb sayes this or that (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs speak ;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.

7. The seventh, to names that signifie nothing ; but are [21] taken up, and learned by rote from the Schooles, as

hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternal-Now, and the like canting of Schoolemen.

To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account ; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him ?

Science. By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us ; nor gotten by Experience onely, as Prudence is ; but attayned by Industry ; first in apt imposing of Names ; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another ; and so to Syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand ; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and Memory are but

knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable ; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and depen- dance of one fact upon another : by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time : Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner ; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects.

Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained the use of Speech : but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in numbring to some degree ; yet it serves them to little use in common life ; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends ; but specially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring : But for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition with their naturall Prudence ; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged [22] from ambiguity ; Reason is the pace ; Encrease of Science, the way ; and the Benefit of man-kind, the end. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and

Prudence <S* Sapi ence, with their dif ference.

ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui ; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities ; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.

As, much Experience, is Prudence ; so, is much Science, Sapience. For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both ; yet the Latines did alwayes distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia ; ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes ; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his

adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard : The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience ; both usefull ; but the later infallible. But they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of a master of Fence, ventures presumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.

The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible ; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same ; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another : Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. Signes of prudence are all uncertain ; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by ; to forsake his own naturall judgement, and be guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned ; having Prudence enough for their private affaires : but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successe of anothers businesse.

Of the Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions ; com monly called, the PASSIONS. And the Speeches by which they are expressed.

THERE be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar Motion to them : One called Vitall ; begun in generation, and Vitall and continued without interruption through their whole life ; such as are the course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the Breath ing, the Concoction, Nutrition, Excretion, &c ; to which Motions there needs no help of Imagination : The other is Animall motion, otherwise called Voluntary motion ; as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense, is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, (S-c ; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a pre cedent thought of whither, which way, and what ; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although un studied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible ; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible ; yet that doth not hinder, but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR. £«-

This Endeavour, when it is toward something which deavour- causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE ; the later, being Appetite. the generall name ; and the other, of ten-times restrayned Desire. to signifie the Desire of Food, namely Hunger and Thirst. Hunger. And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is Thirst. generally called AVERSION. These words Appetite, and Aversion. Aversion we have from the Latines ; and they both of

them signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are 6p/zr), and a^op/my. For Nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at. For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go, or move, no actuall Motion at all : but because some Motion they must acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion ; which is but an absurd speech : for though Words may be called metaphoricall ; Bodies, and Motions cannot

Love. That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE :

Hate. and to HATE those things, for which they have Aversion.

[24] So that Desire, and Love, are the same thing ; save that

by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of the Object ;

by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So

also by Aversion, we signifie the Absence ; and by Hate,

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men ; as Appetite of food, Appetite of excretion, and exonera tion, (which may also and more properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies ;) and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from Ex perience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast arid try. But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us ; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we Contempt, are said to Contemne : CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things ; and proceeding from that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects ; or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation ; it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same Appetites, and Aversions : much lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.

But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire ; that is it, which he .:or his part calleth Good : Good. And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill ; And of Evill. his Contempt, Vile and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them : There being nothing simply and absolutely so ; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves ; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth ;) or, (in a Com mon-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of Good and Evill ; but are not pre cisely the same ; And those are Pulchrum and Turpe. Pulchrum. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some ap- Turpe- parent signes promiseth Good ; and the later, that, which promiseth Evil. But in our Tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by. But for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fayre ; in others, Beautifull, or Handsome ; or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable ; and for Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require ; All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els, but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and Evil. So that of Good there be three kinds ; Good in the Promise, that is Pulchrum ; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called Jucundum, Delightfull ; and Delight- Good as the Means, which is called Utile, Profitable; and Vl'fi. ,, as many of Evil : For Evill, in Promise, is that they call Turpe ; Evil in Effect, and End, is Molestum, Unpleasant, [25] Troublesome ; and Evill in the Means, Inutile, Unprofit- Unpleas- able, Hurtfull. "un'profit-

As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (as I have able. sayd before) onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence ; to the Sight, Light and Colour ; to the Eare, Sound ; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c : so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart ; the

reall effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour ; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion, and a help thereunto ; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were not improperly called Jucunda, (a Juvando,) from helping or fortifying ; and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vitall.

Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,} is the apparence, or sense of Good ; and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of Evill. And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some Delight more or lesse ; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse Displeasure and Offence.

Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present ; And those may be called Pleasures of Sense, (The word sensuall, as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be Lawes.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the body ; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, or Touch ; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things ; whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease : And these are Pleasures of the Mind of him that draweth those consequences ; and are generally called JOY. In the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE ; others, in the Expecta tion of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.

These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and Griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated.

Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them to gether. Fourthly, from the Alteration or succession it selfe.

For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called Hope. HOPE.

The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE. Despaire.

Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE. Feare.

The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resist- ence, COURAGE. Courage.

Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves. fidence.

Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves. Diffidence.

Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive t26! the same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION. Indigna-

Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE : a name used Good alwayes in signification of blame ; because men contend- Nature. ing for them, are displeased with one anothers attaining Covetous- them ; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or nesse- allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.

Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION : a name Ambition. used also in the worse sense, for the reason before men tioned.

Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends ; Pusillani- And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, mity. PUSILLANIMITY.

Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY. Magnani-

Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, mi*y- FORTITUDE.

Magnanimity, in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY. Liberality.

Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISER- Misemble- ABLENESSE ; or PARSIMONY ; as it is liked, or disliked. nesse-

Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE. Kind-

Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURALL nesse.

Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is, Luxury. Imagination of Pleasure past, LUXURY.

Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly The Pas- beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear sion °f that the love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE. Jealous'

Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him con- Revenge-' demn some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE. fulnesse.

Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY ; such as is in no living creature but Man : so that Man is dis tinguished, not onely by his Reason ; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals ; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by pre dominance, take away the care of knowing causes ; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.

Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION ; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR ; called so from the Fables, that make Pan the author of them ; whereas in truth, there is alwayes in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by Example ; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION ; proper to Man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Joy, arising from imagination of a mans own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING : which if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with Confidence : but if grounded on the flattery of others ; or onely supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAINE-GLORY : which name is properly given ; because a well grounded Confidence begetteth Attempt ; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.

Grief e, from opinion of want of power, is called DEJEC TION of mind.

The vain-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in our selves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Histories, or Fictions of Gallant Persons ; and is corrected oftentimes by Age, and Employment.

Sudden Glory, is the passion which maketh those Sudden Grimaces called LAUGHTER ; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them ; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud them selves. And it is incident most to them, that are con scious of the fewest abilities in themselves ; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others, is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn ; and com pare themselves onely with the most able.

On the contrary, Sudden Dejection, is the passion that Sudden causeth WEEPING ; and is caused by such accidents, as Dejection. suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop WeePmS- of their power : And they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are Women, and Children.

Therefore some Weep for the losse of Friends ; Others for their unkindnesse ; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both Laughter, and Weeping, are sudden motions ; Custome taking them both away. For no man Laughs at old jests ; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Grief e, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is Shame. SHAME, or the passion that discovereth it selfe in BLUSH- Blushing. ING ; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable ; and in young men, is a signe of the love of good reputation ; and commendable : In old men it is a signe of the same ; but because it comes too late, not commendable.

The Contempt of good Reputation is called IMPUDENCE. Impu-

Griefe, for the Calamity of another, is PITTY ; and dence- arisethi from the imagination that the like calamity may l y' befall himselfe ; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FEELING : And therefore for Calamity arriving from great wicked ness, the best men have the least Pitty ; and for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think them selves least obnoxious to the same.

Cruelty. Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is

[28] that which men call CRUELTY ; proceeding from Security

of their own fortune. For, that any man should take

pleasure in other mens great harmes, without other end

of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Griefe, for the successe of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equall or exceed him, is called EMULATION : But joyned with Endeavour to supplant, or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.

When in the mind of man, Appetites, and Aversions, Hopes, and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately ; and divers good and evill conse quences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts ; so that sometimes we have an Appetite to it ; sometimes an Aversion from it ; sometimes Hope to be able to do it ; some times Despaire, or Feare to attempt it ; the whole summe of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is

Delibera- that we call DELIBERATION.

tion. Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation ;

because manifestly impossible to be changed : nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so ; because men know, or think such Deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate ; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called Deliberation ; because it is a putting an end to

the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.

This alternate Succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, is no lesse in other living Creatures then in Man : and therefore Beasts also Deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then sayd to End, when that whereof they Deliberate, is either done, or thought, impossible ; because till then wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or Aversion.

In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, imme diately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, The Will, is that wee call the WILL ; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation, must

necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. Will therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he forbore to do ; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary ; because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites, make any action Voluntary ; then by the same Reason all intervenient Aversions, should make the same action Involuntary ; and so one and the same action, should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have [29] their beginning from Covetousnesse, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded ; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are volun tary actions.

The formes of Speech by which the Passions are Formes of expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from Speech, in those, by which wee expresse our Thoughts. And first, generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively ; as / love, I feare, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command : but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which neverthelesse are not affirmations, unlesse it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is ex pressed Subjunctively ; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences ; as, // this be done, then this will follow ; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words ; but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative ; as Do this, forbeare that ; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbeare, is Command ; other-

wise Prayer ; or els Counsell. The language of Vain- Glory, of indignation, Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative : But of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar expression, called Interrogative ; as, What is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why so ? other language of the Passions I find none : For Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do not signifie as Speech ; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These formes of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our Passions : but certain signes they be not ; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aimes, which we otherwise know the man to have.

And because in Deliberation, the Appetites, and

Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill

consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we

Deliberate ; the good or evill effect thereof dependetli

on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which

very seldome any man is able to see to the end. But for

Good and so farre as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences,

Evill ap- be greater than the Evill, the whole chaine is that which

parent. Writers call Apparent, or Seeming Good. And contrarily,

when the Evill exceedeth the Good, the whole is Apparent

or Seeming Evill : so that he who hath by Experience, or

Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences,

Deliberates best himselfe ; and is able when he will, to

give the best counsell unto others.

Continuall sitccesse in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, cori- Felidty. tinuall prospering, is that men call FELICITY ; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquillity of mind, while we live here ; because Life it selfe is but Motion, and can never be [30] without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joyes, that now are as incomprehen sible, as the word of Schoole-men Beatificall Vision is unintelligible.

The forme of Speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse of any thing, is PRAISE. That Praise. whereby they signifie the power and greatnesse of any thing, is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie Magnifi- the opinion they have of a mans Felicity, is by the catlon- Greeks called ^aKapio-fids, for which wee have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the PASSIONS.

Of the Ends, or Resolutions of DISCOURSE.

OF all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be, or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Prsesumption of it will be, or, it will not be ; or it has been, or, has not been. All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil ; the same is alternate Opinion, in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation, is called the Will ; so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is, called the JUDGEMENT, or Judge- Resolute and Finall Sentence of him that discourseth. went, or And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the Sentence question of Good, or Bad, is called Deliberation ; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False, is called DOUBT. Doubt.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute know ledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense ; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but

Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be ; which is to know absolutely : but onely, that if This be, That is ; if This has been, That has been ; if This shall be, That shall be : which is to know conditionally ; and that not the consequence of one thing to another ; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into generall Affirmations, [31] and of these again into Syllogismes; the End or last summe is called the Conclusion ; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditionall Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is com-

Science. monly called SCIENCE. But if the first ground of such Discourse, be not Definitions ; or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the

Opinion. End or Conclusion, is again OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being under stood. When two, or more men, know of one and the

Cow- same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it one to

science. another ; which is as much as to know it together. And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third ; it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to speak against his Con science ; or to corrupt or force another so to do : Inso much that the plea of Conscience, has been alwayes hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts ; and therefore it is Rhetorically said, that the Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of Con science, as if they would have it seem unlawfull, to

change or speak against them ; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so.

When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion ; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not ; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person ; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH : Faith, in the man ; Beleefe, both Beiiefe. of the man, and of the truth of what he sayes. So that Faith. in Beleefe are two opinions ; one of the saying of the man ; the other of his vertue. To have faith in, or trust to, or beleeve a man, signifie the same thing ; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to beleeve what is said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase, / beleeve in ; as also the Latine, Credo in ; and the Greek, Trio-reuw eis, are never used but in the writings of Divines. In stead of them, in other writings are put, / beleeve him ; / trust him ; / have faith in him ; / rely on him ; and in Latin, Credo illi ; fido illi : and in Greek, Trio-re vw dvru : and that this singularity of the Ecclesiastique use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.

But by Beleeving in, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the Person ; but Confession and acknow ledgement of the Doctrine. For not onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not ; which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever : But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe [32] any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it ; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith ; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely. And conse quently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the

word of God, having no immediate revelation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church ; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him0 trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I should not believe all that is written by Historians, of the glorious acts of Alexander, or Ccesar ; I do not think the Ghost of Alexander, or Casar, had any just cause to be offended ; or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not ; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, then what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings ; whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.

Of the VERTUES commonly called INTELLECTUALL ; and their contrary DEFECTS. '

VERTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence ; and consisteth in com parison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are alwayes understood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire

should be in themselves ; and go commonly under the name of a good wit ; though the same word WIT, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

These Vertues are of two sorts ; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall, I mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth : for that is nothing else but Sense ; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that Wit, which is gotten by Use onely, and

Experience ; without Method, Culture, or Instruction. This NATURALL WIT, consisteth principally in two things ; Naturall Celerity of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one Wlt- thought to another ;) and steddy direction to some approved end. On the Contrary a slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the [33] difference of mens passions ; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another : and therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another ; and are held to, and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination. And whereas in this succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be like one another, or in what they be unlike, or what they serve for, or how they serve to such a purpose ; Those that observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a Good Wit ; by which, in Good Wit, this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they that or Fancy- observe their differences, and dissimilitudes ; which is called Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing ; in case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a good Judgement : and particu- Good larly in matter of conversation and businesse ; wherein, Jud§e- times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue m is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy, with- Discre- out the help of Judgement, is not commended as a Vertue : tlon- but the later which is Judgement, and Discretion, is com mended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an often applica tion of his thoughts to their End ; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done ; he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors ; but also, by the rarity of their invention. But without Steddinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of

Madnesse ; such as they have, that entring into any dis course, are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and Parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves : Which kind of folly, I know no particular name for : but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience ; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others : sometimes Pusil lanimity ; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, with- drawes a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique ; as also in Sonnets, Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required : But the Fancy must be more eminent ; because they please for the

Extravagancy ; but ought not to displease by Indis cretion.

In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent ; because the goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but onely in adorning the stile.

In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is predominant ; because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour ; which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.

[34] In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the Designe in hand ; so is the Judge ment, or the Fancy most required.

In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth, Judgement does all ; except some times the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude ; and then there is so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly professe deceipt ; to admit them into Councell, or Reasoning, were manifest folly.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a signe of want of wit ; and so will it never when the Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame ; which verball discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things ; because it is not to please, but profit : but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good company. And 'tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference. Again, in profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar com pany, a man may play with the sounds, and sequivocall significations of words ; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary Fancy : but in a Sermon, or in publique, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of words that will not be accounted folly : and the difference is onely in the want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy that is wanting, but Discretion. Judge ment therefore without Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.

When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe ; or what designe they may conduce unto ; if his observations be such as are not easie, or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE ; Prudence. and dependeth on much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is in their Fancies and Judgements ; Because the Experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity ; but lyes in different occasions ; every one having his private designes. To govern well a family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence ; but different sorts of businesse ; no more then to draw

a picture in little, or as great, or greater then the life, are different degrees of Art. A plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Coun- seller in the affaires of another man.

To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want ; you have that Crooked Wisdome, which is Cm//. [3 5] called CRAFT ; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the Latines call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,} and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft, called Versutia, from Versura, which signifies taking mony at usurie, for the present payment of interest.

Acquired As for acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and

w/ii> instruction,) there is none but Reason ; which is grounded

on the right use of Speech ; and produceth the Sciences.

But of Reason and Science, I have. already spoken in the

The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions : and the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of the body, and partly from different Education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies, and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the Passions ; which are different, not onely from the difference of mens com plexions ; but also from their difference of customes, and education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.

And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things ; but is as men terme it indifferent ;

though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free from

giving offence ; yet he cannot possibly have either

a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts,

are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad,

and find the way to the things Desired : All Stedinesse

of the minds motion, and all quicknesse of the same,

proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to

be Dead : so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse ; and

to have Passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, Giddi-

and Distraction ; and to have stronger, and more vehe- nesse-

ment Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in

others, is that which men call MADNESSE. Madnesse.

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the evill constitu tion of the organs of the Body, or harme done them ; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the Madnesse is of one and the same nature.

The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either great vaine-Glory ; which is commonly called Pride, and selfe-conceipt ; or great Dejection of mind.

Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse called RAGE, and FURY. And thus flag*, it comes to passe that excessive desire of Revenge, [36] when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes Rage : That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage : Excessive opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome, learning, forme, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddi- nesse : The same, joyned with Envy, Rage : Vehement opinion of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, Rage.

Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears ; which is a Madnesse commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent Melan- also in divers manners ; as in haunting of solitudes, and choly> graves ; in superstitious behaviour ; and in fearing some one, some another particular thing. In summe, all Passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour,

are called by the generall name of Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the Excesses be madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions them selves, when they tend to Evill, are degrees of the same.

(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion ; yet when many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends ? Yet this is some what lesse than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their life-time before, they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him ; yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of the same quantity : so also, though wee perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men ; yet we may be well assured, that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse ; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam should entertaine you with sober dis course ; and you desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility ; and he should tell you, he were God the Father ; I think you

need expect no extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.

This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally held by others ; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently

admire themselves ; as being in the speciall grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion, may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with those of the evill disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour [37] in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of Mad-men : some of them Raging, others Loving, others Laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their severall domineering Passions : For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation ; and take from them the sight of the deformity of their Passions. For, (I believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen : which is a con fession, that Passions unguided, are^for the most part meere Madnesse.

The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning the cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the Passions ; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs in such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad men use to do. The former sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men : but the Later, called them sometimes Dcemoniacks, (that is, possessed with spirits ;) sometimes Energumeni, (that is, agitated, or moved with spirits ;) and now in Italy they are called not onely Pazzi, Mad men ; but also Spiritati, men possest.

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the Greeks, at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda., upon an extream hot day : whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, had this accident from the heat, and from the Tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce lambiques, with the names of Perseus and Andromeda ; which together with the Fever, was cured, by the comming on of Winter : And this madnesse was thought to proceed from the Passion imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise

there raigned a fit of madnesse in another Grsecian City, which seized onely the young Maidens ; and caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not con- temne also their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip such as so hang'd themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the story sayes cured that madnesse. But on the other side, the same Graecians, did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the Eumenides, or Furyes ; and sometimes of Ceres, Phcebus, and other Gods : so much did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them ae'real living bodies ; and generally to call them Spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks : so also did the Jewes ; For they called mad-men Prophets, or (according as they thought

the spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks ; and some of them called both Prophets, and Daemoniacks. mad-men ; and some called the same man both Dasmoniack, and mad-man. But for the Gentiles, 'tis no wonder ; because Diseases, and Health ; Vices, and Vertues ; and many naturall accidents, were with them termed, and wor shipped as Daemons. So that a man was to understand by Daemon, as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell. [38] But for the Jewes to have such opinion, is somewhat strange. For neither Moses, nor Abraham pretended to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit ; but from the voyce of God ; or by a Vision or Dream : Nor is there any thing in his Law, . Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there was any such Enthusiasme ; or any Pos session. When God is sayd, Numb. n. 25. to take from the Spirit that was in Moses, and give to the 70. Elders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to Godlinesse. And where it is said Exod. 28. 3. Whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron, is not meant a spirit put into them, that can make garments ; but the wisdome of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth

unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit ; and so other spirits, though not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament pretend Enthusiasme ; or, that God spake in them ; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream ; and the Burthen of the Lord was not Possession, but Com mand. How then could the Jewes fall into this opinion of possession ? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men ; namely, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes ; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or defect in a mans mind ; unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall ; and if not naturall, they must needs thinke it supernaturall ; and then what can it be, but that either God, or the Divell is in him ? And hence it came to passe, when our Saviour (Mark 3. 21.) was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him : but the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out divels ; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. And that (John 10. 20.) some said, He hath a Divell, and is mad ; whereas others holding him for a Prophet, sayd, These are not the words of one that hath a Divell. So in the old Testament he that came to anoynt Jehu, 2 Kings 9. n. was a Prophet ; but some of the company asked Jehu, What came that mad-man for? So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved him- selfe in extraordinory manner, was thought by the Jewes to be possessed either with a good, or evill spirit ; except by the Sadduces, who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme ;) and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to terme such men Daemoniacks, rather than mad-men.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possest ; and not as if they were mad ? To which I can give no other kind of answer, but

that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdome of God, and to prepare their mindes to become [39] his obedient subjects ; leaving the world, and the Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their naturall Reason. Whether the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and

night ; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or from the Divell, (so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty ; which is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person ; it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and Inchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a Divel or not.) For is not Christ also said (Math. 8. 26.) to have rebuked the winds ? Is not he said also (Luk. 4. 39.) to rebuke a Fever ? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Divel. And whereas many of those Divels are said to confesse Christ ; it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those mad-men confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.) speaketh of an unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none ; and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himselfe ; It is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them ; and becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe, that Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.

Insignifi- cant men ; which may also be numbred amongst the sorts Speech. of Madnesse ; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all ; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote ; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoole-men ; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy. The common sort of men seldome speak Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other Egregious persons counted Idiots. But to be assured their words are without any thing corre spondent to them in the mind, there would need some Examples ; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point ; as the Trinity ; the Deity ; the nature of Christ ; Transub- stantiation ; Free-will, 6-c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make the same intelligible ; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they were acquainted withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was Vulgar. What is the meaning of these words. The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second., by force of the Essentiall subordination of the second causes, by Which it may help it to worke ? They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of Suarez first Booke, Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so ? And particularly, in the question of [40] Transubstantiation ; where after certain words spoken, they that say, the Whitenesse,

Roundnesse, Magnitude, Quality, Corruptibility, all which are incorporeall, &c. go out of the Wafer, into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those Nesses, Tudes, and Ties, to be so many spirits possessing his body ? For by Spirits, they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are never- thelesse moveable from one place to another. So that this kind of Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse ; and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals. And thus much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectual! .

O/ //^ Severall SUBJECTS of KNOWLEDGE.

THERE are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds ; whereof one is Knowledge of Fact : the other Knowledge of the Conse quence of one A formation to another. The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute Knowledge ; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done : And this is the Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is called Science ; and is Conditionall ; as when we know, that, // the figure showne be a Circle, then any straight line through the Center shall divide it into two equall parts. And this is the Knowledge required in a Philosopher ; that is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.

The Register of Knowledge of Fact is called History. Whereof there be two sorts : one called Naturall History ; which is the History of such Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will ; Such as are the Histories of Metalls, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the Jike. The other, is Civill History ; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in Common wealths.

The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another ; and are commonly called Books of Philosophy \ whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the Matter ; And may be divided in such manner as I have divided thejn in the following Table.

Of POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR, and WORTHINESSE.

Power. THE POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good. 'And is either Originally or Instrumentall.

Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of __ Bocly, or Mind : as extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility. Instru mentall are those Powers, which acquired by these," or by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire ~ more : as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the secret- working of God, which men call Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds ; or like the motion of- heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more hast.

The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or Civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will ; such as is the Power of a Common-wealth : Or depending on the wills of each particular ; such as is the Power of a Fac tion, or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants, is Power ; To have friends, is Power : for they are strengths united.

Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power ; because it procureth friends, and servants : Without liberality, not so ; because in this case they defend not ; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.

Reputation of power, is Power ; because it draweth with it the adhserence of those that need protection.

So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,) for the same Reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many ; or the reputation of such quality, is Power ; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.

Good successe is Power ; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or good fortune ; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power ; because it gaineth love.

Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power ; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to others.

Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths, where it has Priviledges : for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.

Eloquence is power ; because it is seeming Prudence.

Forme is Power ; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and [42] strangers.

The Sciences, are small Power ; becausejiot eminent ; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man ; nor are at all, but in a few ; and in them, but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.

Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other Instruments of War ; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are Power : And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the Mathematiques ; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue.

The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price ; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power : and therefore is not absolute ; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War present, or imminent ; but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace ; but not so much in War. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man (as most men do,) rate them selves at the highest Value they can ; yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called Honouring, and Dis honouring. To Value a man at a high rate, is to Honour him ; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himselfe.

The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the Common- wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this Value of him by the Common -wealth, is understood, by offices of Command,^ Judicature, publike Employment ; or by Names and Titles, introduced for distinction of such Value. "Tb~ pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR ; because a signe we have an opinion he has power to help ; and the more difficult the ayde is, the more is the Honour.

To obey, is to Honour ; because no man obeyes them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to Dishonour.

To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him ; because 'tis buying of Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to Dishonour ; because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps.

To be sedulous in promoting anothers good ; also to flatter, is to Honour ; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. To neglect, is to Dishonour.

To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour ; being a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.

To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to [43] Honour ; for both to love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare, then he expects, is to Dishonour ; for 'tis undervaluing.

To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour ; because nothing but goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is to Dishonour.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to Honour him ; as signes of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do any thing before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to Dishonour.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him ; signe of opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour.

To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to Honour ; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour ; because in approving the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.

To agree with in opinion, is to -Honour ; as being a signe of approving his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour ; and an upbraiding of errour ; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to Honour ; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.

To honour those another honours, is to Honour him ; as a signe of approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour him.

To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour ; as a signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.

All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall ; and as well within, as without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signes of Honour, there be other Honours.

A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office, or Employment, or Action, that he him- selfe will have taken for a signe of his will to Honour him.

The King of Persia, Honoured M or decay, when he appointed he should be conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him, proclayming, Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour. And yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that demanded for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes, gave him leave

so to do ; but with this addition, that he should weare it as the Kings foole ; and then it was Dishonour. So that of Civ ill Honour, the Fountain is in the person of the Common- wealth, and dependeth on the Will of the Soveraigne ; and is therefore temporary, and called [44] Civill Honour ; such as are Magistracy, Offices, Titles ; and in some places Coats, and Scutchions painted : and men Honour such as have them, as having so many signes of favour in the Common-wealth ; which favour is Power.

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and signe of Power.

And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable ; as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.

Dominion, and Victory is Honourable ; because acquired by Power ; and Servitude, for need, or feare, is Dishonourable.

Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable ; as a signe of the favour of God. Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable ; for they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable ; for they proceed fro.a the conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.

Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is Honourable ; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. And Irresolution, Dishonour able ; as a signe of too much valuing of little impedi ments, and little advantages : For when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little ; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.

All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable ; For all these are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.

Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on some thing else, is Honourable ;

because employment is a signe of Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is Dis honourable. For the gravity of the former, is like the steddinesse of a Ship laden with Merchandise ; but of the later, like the steddinesse of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.

To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable ; as a signe of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dis honourable.

To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honour able ; because they the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable ; as signes of Magnanimity : for Magna nimity is a signe of Power. On the contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.

Covetousnesse of great Riches, and ambition of great Honours, are Honourable ; as signes of power to obtain them. Covetousnesse, and ambition, of little gaines, or preferments, is Dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a signe of [45] much power,) be just or unjust : for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts : In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries ; nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts : of whose praises, in a hymne of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolne away the Cattell of Apollo, from his Herdsmen.

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe ; but rather a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst

all other Nations ; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. And at this day, in this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage ; and the ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power ; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one, or both the Combatants ; who engaged byrashnesse, are driven into the Lists to avoyd disgrace. Coats of Scutchions, and Coats of Armes haereditary, where Armes. they have any eminent Priviledges, are Honourable ; otherwise not : for their Power consisteth either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, com monly called Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans. For there never was any such thing known, where the German Customes were unknown. Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The antient Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with such Devises as they pleased ; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier : but they transmitted not the Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families : but they were the Images, not

the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia, Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans onely had that custome ; from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain and Italy, when in great numbers they either ayded the Romans, or made their own Con quests in these Westerne parts of the world.

For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or Masters of Families, that continually had wars one with another ; those Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might, when they were Covered with Arms, be known by their followers ; and partly for ornament, both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or

other thing ; and also put some eminent and visible [46] mark upon the Crest of their Helmets. And this orna ment both of the Armes, and Crest, descended by inheri tance to their Children ; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt thought fit. But when many such Families, joyned together, made a greater Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchions, was made a private Office a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great and antient Gentry ; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine ; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and other notes of War ; nothing being then in honour, but vertue military. Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common wealths, gave divers manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned from it, for encourage ment, or recompence to their service. All which, by an observing Reader, may be found in such antient Histories, Greek and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their times.

Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, Titles of and Baron, are Honourable ; as signifying the value set Honour. upon them by the Soveraigne Power of the Common wealth : Which Titles, were in old time titles of Ofnce, and Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine Duces, being Generalls in War : Counts, Comites, such as bare the Generall company out of friendship ; and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified : Marquises, Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the Empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of the German Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules, and signifies a Great man ; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom they employed in war about their persons ; and seems to be derived from Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified the same in the Language of the Gaules, that Vir in Latine ; and thence to Bero, and Baro : so that such men were called Berones,

and after Barones ; and (in Spanish) Varones. But he that would know more particularly the origin all of Titles of Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent Treatise of that subject. In processe oi time these offices of Honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peaceable government, were turned into meer Titles ; serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth : and men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command : and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.

Worthi- WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or

nesse. value of a man ; and also from his merit, or desert ; and

sse' consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that,

whereof he is said to be worthy : which particular ability.

is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.

For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted, with the [47] qualities required to the well discharging of it ; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them : any of which qualities being absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valuable for some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and Employment, that never thelesse, can plead no right to have it before another ; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For Merit, praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise : Of which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.

BY MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour ;

as how one man should salute another, or how a man

should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company,

What is and such other points of the Small Moralls ; But those

here qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together

meant by jn peace and Unity. To which end we are to consider,

that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose8 of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one oFject to another ; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time ; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not onely to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life ; and differ onely in the way : which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men ; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.

So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclina- A restlesse tion of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And g^JJ^*11 the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to ; or that he cannot content with a moderate power : but because he , t assure the power __and means to live well, whicl o.th present, without the

acquisition of more. And Hum hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars : and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire ; in some, of Fame from new Conquest ; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure ; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.

Competition of Riches, Honour, Command, or other power, enclineth to Contention, Enmity, and War : [48] Because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining £^jn_ of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the tion from other. Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth Competi- to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend with ti°n-

?ne living, not with the dead ; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.

» Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men

idience to obey a common Power : Because by .such Desires,

'of^ase6 a man ^otk abandon the protection might be hoped for

Fvom ' from his own Industry, and labour. Fear of Death, and

feave of Wounds, disposeth to the same ; and for the same

Death, or reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not

Wounds, contented with their present condition ; as also, all men

that are ambitious of Military command, are enclined

to continue the causes of warre ; and to stirre up

trouble and sedition : for there is no honour Military

but by warre ; nor any such hope to mend an ill game,

And from Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth love of men to obey a common Power : For such Desire, con- taineth a desire of leasure ; and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.

Love of Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such Vertue, as please them whose judgement they value ; for of

^of'praise t^lose men wnom we contemn, we contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the. praise given us on Earth, as being joyes, that are either swal lowed up in the unspeakable joyes of Heaven, or ex tinguished in the extreme torments of Hell : yet is not such Fame vain ; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity : which though they now see not, yet they imagine ; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

Hate, from To have received from one, to whom we think our

difficulty selves equall, greater benefits than there is hope to

in reat" Reclmte> disposeth to counterfeit love ; but really secret

Benefits, hatred ; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate

debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely

wishes him there, where he might never see him more.

For benefits oblige ; and obligation is thraldome ; and

unrequitable obligation, perpetuall thraldome ; which

is to ones equall, hatefull. But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge for superiour, enclines to love ; because the obligation is no new depression : and cheerfull acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love : for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall ; from whence proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting ; the most noble and profitable contention possible ; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is A nd from willing to expiate, enclineth the doer to hate the suf- c™~ ferer. For he must expect re|venge, or forgivenesse ; ^s^ving both which are hatefull. to be hated.

Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or [49] to seek"ayd by society : for there is no other way fay Prompt- which a man can secure his life and liberty. hurt jrom

Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, Fear. and sedition, better disposed for victory, than they that And from suppose themselves wise, or crafty. For these love to distrust of consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike ^(first. And in sedition, men being alwayes in the pro- cincts of battell, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can pro ceed from subtilty of Wit.

Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious Vain to themselves of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are enclined onely to ostenta- tion ; but not to attempt : Because when danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have glory. their insufficiency discovered.

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to rash engaging ; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can : because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may

be salved with an excuse ; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.

Ambition, Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome

from in matter of government, are disposed to Ambition.

opinion of Because without publique Employment in counsell or

magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is lost. And

therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition ;

for Eloquence seemeth wisedome, both to themselves

Irresolu- Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and con-

tion, from sequently to lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities

v'aluin^ °* ac^on- For after men have been in deliberation till

o/swa?/ the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest

matters, what is best to be done, 'tis a signe, the difference of

Motives, the one way and the other, are not great :

Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by

weighing of trifles ; which is Pusillanimity.

Frugality, (though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once : For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.

Confi- Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in

dence in them that have it ; because the former is seeming Wis- other, dome, the later seeming Kindnesse. Adde to them Ignorance Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhaere, of the and subject themselves to those men that have them. marks of The two former, having given them caution against ^an^Ki/nd- ^an§er fr°m him ; the later gives them caution against "nesse™ ~ danger from others.

And from Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, dis- Ignorance poseth, or rather constraineth a man to rely on the of natural! ^i and authority of others. For all men whom the

truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.

[5°] Ignorance of the signification of words ; which is, 'want ^/°m want °f understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, ^Under- not onely the truth they know not ; but also* the errors ; standing, and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust :

For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.

From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions : As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion ; but they that mislike it, Haere- sie : and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion ; but has onely a greater tincture of choler.

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude ; as for example, between the one action of all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of Senators in killing Ccesar ; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.

Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution oiAdhar- Right, Equity, Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to ence to make Custome and Example the rule of his actions ; in 9r^ome such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been ig™orance the custome to punish ; and that Just, of the impunity of the and approbation whereof they can produce an Example, nature of or (as the Lawyers which onely use this false measure ^ht and of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent ; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evill man ners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and Masters ; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so ; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn ; receding from custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them : Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword : Whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so ; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, rjrofit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That the three Angles

of a Triangle, should be equall to two Angles of a Square ; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.

Adhar- Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute

ence to ^\\ events, to the causes immediate, and Instrumental! :

men From ^or tnese are a^ tne causes they perceive. And hence

Ignorance it comes to passe, that in all places, men that are grieved

of the with payments to the Publique, discharge their anger

Causes of UpOn the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors,

lce' and other Officers of the publique Revenue ; and adhaere

to such as find fault with the publike Government ; and

thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope

[51] of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority,

for feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon. Credulity Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to from Credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities :

For such know nothin§ to the contrary, but that they may be true ; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying : so that Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a man both to believe lyes, and tell them ; and sometimes also to invent them. Curiosity Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire to know, int0 the causes of things : because the knowledge of Orf° future^ them' maketh men the better able to order the present time. to their best advantage.

Naturall Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws Rehgion, a man from consideration of the effect, to seek the same * cause ', and again, the cause of that cause ; till of neces sity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former caus?, but is eternall ; which is it men call God. So that it is impos sible to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall ; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm him self by the same, may easily conceive, and assure him- selfe, there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and

is the cause of the heat he feeles ; but cannot imagine what it is like ; nor have an Idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it : so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God ; and yet not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.

And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things, yet from the feare that pro ceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible ; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations ; and in time of distresse to invoke them ; as also in the time of an expected good successe, to give them thanks ; making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to passe, that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is the naturall Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion ; and in them that worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.

And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many ; some of those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and forme it into Lawes ; and to adde to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.

SEEING there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but Religion, in Man onely ; there is no cause to doubt, but that «w Man the seed of Religion, is also onely in Man ; and con- onelV' sisteth in some peculiar

quality, or at least in some eminent degree therof, not to be found in other Living creatures.

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into the Causes of the Events they see, some more» some lesse ; but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill fortune.

Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, to think also it had a cause, which determme(^ t^ie same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later.

Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying of their quotidian Food, Ease, and

Lusts ' ^ havinS little' or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and dependance of the things they see ; Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another ; and remembreth in them Antecedence and Consequence ; And when he cannot assure himselfe of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth ; or trusteth to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himselfe.

The two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or sna^ arrive hereafter ; it is impossible for a man, wno continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desire th, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come ; So that every man, especially those that are over pro vident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, The prudent man,} was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repayred in the night : So that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity ; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the Dark, must nee(^s have for object something. And therefore when

there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, of Ihvi- either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power, or s/ible Agent Invisible : In which sense perhaps it was, that thlnSs- some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare : which spoken of the Gods, [53] (that is to say, of the many Gods of the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging of one God Eternal!, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and operations ; than from the feare of what was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe profoundly in the pursuit of causes ; shall at last come to this, that there rnngt fop (as~~even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First Mover. ; that is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things ; which is that which men mean by the name of God : And all this without thought of their fortune ; the solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things ; and thereby 'gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as there be men that feigne them.

And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible A nd sup- Agents, so fancyed ; they could not by naturall cogita- Pose tion, fall upon any other conceipt, but that it was the same with that of the Soule of man ; and that the Soule of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream, to one that sleepeth ; or in a Looking-glasse, to one that is awake ; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall, and externall Substances ; and therefore call them Ghosts ; as the Latines called them Imagines, and Umbra \ and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies ; and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them ; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature ; because, though men may put together

words of contradictory signification, as Spirit,, and Incor- poreall ; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them : And therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall God, choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above their understanding ; than to define his Nature by Spirit Incorporeall, and then confesse their definition to be unintelligible : or if they give him such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature understood ; but Piously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grosse- nesse of Bodies Visible.

But know Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible not the Agents wrought their effects ; that is to say, what imme- way how djate causes they used, in bringing things to passe, men

anything. that know not what ^ is that we cal1 causing (that is, ' almost all men) have no other rule to guesse bys but by observing, and remembring what they have seen 'to pre cede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent Event, any dependance or connexion at all : And there fore from the like things past, they expect the like things, to come ; and hope for good or evill luck, supersti- tiously, from things that have no part at all in the [54] causing of it : As the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio ; The Pompeian fac tion for their warre in Afrique, another Scipio ; and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them ; as Charming, and Conjuring (the Leiturgy of Witches ;) insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into any thing. But Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite

honour to Powers invisible, it can be no other, but such ex- ^sThe pressions of their reverence, as they would use towards 'honour men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission of Body, Con- men. siderate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words, Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their

promises,) by invoking them. Beyond that reason sug- gesteth nothing ; but leaves them either to rest there ; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare And attri- to men the things which shall hereafter come to passe, bt^°all especially concerning their good or evill fortune in extram generall, or good or ill successe in any particular under- ordinary taking, men are naturally at a stand ; save that using events. to

conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to take casuall things, after one or two encounters, for Prognostiques of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like Prog nostiques from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.

And in these f oure things, G^imon of Ghosts, Ignorance Foure of second causes, .Devotion towards what men fear, and things, taking of things Casuall for Prognostiques, consisteth the "Natufall seed of Religion ; which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts Made oil men. One sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods comman dement, and direction : but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society. So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part of humane Politiques ; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is Divine Politiques ; and containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded them selves subjects in the Kingdome of God. Of the former sort, were all the founders of Common-wealths, and the Eaw-givers of the Gentiles : Of the later sort, were .braham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour ; by whom iave been derived unto us the Lawes of the Kingdome >f God.

The And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in

absurd opinions concerning the nature of Powers Invisible, there

°Gentiin °^ is almost nothing that has a name, that has not been

•isme. [55] esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another.

a God, or Divell ; or by their Poets feigned to be inani-

mated, inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.

The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were so many Gods.

Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion, a Leeke, Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with spirits called Demons : the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyres ; the Woods, with Fawnes, and Nymphs ; the Sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs ; every River, and Fount ayn, with a Ghost of his name, and with Nymphs ; every house, with its Lares, or Familiars ; every man, with his Genius ; Hell, with Ghosts, and spirituall Officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies ; and in the night time, all places with Larvce, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears. They have also ascribed Divinity, and built Temples to meer Accidents, and Qualities ; such as are Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Vertue, Honour, Health, Rust, Fever, and the like ; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evill, for, or against which they

prayed. They invoked also their own Wit, by the name of Muses ; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune ; their own Lust, by the name of Cupid ; their own Rage, by the name Furies ; their own privy members by the name of Priapus ; arid attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubcz : insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could introduce as a person in his Poem, which they did not: make either a God, or a Divel.

The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground for Religion, which is men.s Ignorance of causes ; and thereby their aptnesse to

attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no dependance at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministeriall Gods; ascribing the cause of Fcecundity, to Venus ; the cause of Arts, to Apollo ; of Subtilty and Craft, to Mercury ; of Tempests and stormes, to ^Eolus ; and of other effects, to other Gods : insomuch as there was amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.

And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest formerly named ; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture ; that the more ignorant sort, (that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking the Gods for whose representa tion they were made, were really included, and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in feare of them : And endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other humane uses ; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their Idols ; as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains, and whole Hands ; and have attributed to [56] them, not onely the shapes, some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters ; but also the Faculties, and Passions of men and beasts ; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust, Generation, (and this not onely by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of Gods ; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrill Gods, and but inmates of Heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules, and others ;) besides, Anger, Revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as Fraud, Theft, Adultery, Sodomie, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of Power, or a cause of Pleasure ; and all such Vices, as amongst men are taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.

Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come ; which are naturally, but Conjectures upon the Experience of time past ; and supernaturally, divine Revelation ; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended

Revelation, have added innumerable other superstitious wayes of Divination ; and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senslesse answers of the Priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous- Oracles ; which answers, were made ambiguous by designe, to own the event both wayes ; or absurd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes : Sometimes in the leaves of the Sibills ; of whose Prophecyes (like those perhaps of Nostradamus ; for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republique : Sometimes in the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed with a divine Spirit ; which Possession they called Enthusiasme ; and these kinds

of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy, or Prophecy : Sometimes in the aspect of the Starres at their Nativity ; which was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology : Sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called Thumomancy, or Presage : Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended conference with the dead ; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and Witchcraft ; and is but juggling and confederate knavery : Sometimes in the Casuall flight, or feeding of birds ; called Augury : Sometimes in the Entrayles of a sacrificed beast ; which was Aruspicina : Sometimes in Dreams : Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering of Birds : Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face ; which was called Metoposcopy ; or by Palm istry in the lines of the hand ; in casuall words, called O.nina : Sometimes in Monsters, or unusuall accidents ; as Ecclipses, Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the like, which they called Portenta, and Ostenta, because they thought them to Dortend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come : Somtimes, in meer Lottery, as Crosse and Pile ; count ing holes in a sive ; dipping of Verses in Homer, and Virgil ; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts. So easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them ; and can

with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.

And therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of [57] Common -wealths amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were The de~ only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have s^en^su. in all places taken care ; First, to imprint in their thors of the minds a beliefe, that those precepts which they gave Religion concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed °fthe from their own device, but from the dictates of some God, or other Spirit ; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortalls, that their Lawes might the more easily be received : So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria : and the first King and founder of the Kingdome of Peru, pre tended himselfe and his wife to be the children of the Sunne : and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove. Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes. Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacri fices, and Festivalls, by which they were to believe, the anger of the Gods might be appeased ; and that ill success in War, great contagions of Sicknesse, Earth quakes, and each mans private Misery, came from the Anger of the Gods ; and their Anger from the Neglect of their Worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the Ceremonies required. And though amongst the antient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this life ; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their Harangues openly derided ; yet that beliefe was alwaies more cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order to their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the lawes, were the lesse apt to mutiny against their

Governors. And being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of Festivalls, and publike Games, made in honour of the Gods, needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and

commotion against the State. And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known World, made no scruple of tollerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of Rome it selfe ; unlesse it had something in it, that could not consist with their Civill Govern ment ; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jewes ; who (being the peculiar Kingdome of God) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any mortall King or State whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.

The true But where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation,

Religion, planted Religion ; there he also made to himselfe

"awes of a Pecunar Kingdome ; and gave Lawes, not only of

Gods ' behaviour towards himselfe ; but also towards one

kingdome another ; and thereby in the Kingdome of God, the

the same. Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of Religion ; and

[58] therefore the distinction of Temporal!, and Spirituall

Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God

is King of all the Earth : Yet may he be King of

a peculiar, and chosen Nation. For there is no more

incongruity there in, than that he that hath the generall

command of the whole Army, should have withall

a peculiar Regiment, or Company of his own. God

is King of all the Earth by his Power : but of his chosen

people, he is King by Covenant. But to speake more

largly of the Kingdome of God, both by Nature, and

Chap. 35. Covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned an

The From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to

causes of understand the causes of the resolution of the same Religion™ mto *ts ^rst seeo^s' or principles ; which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible, and super naturall ; that can never be so abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.

For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy man, to whom God himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally ; It followeth necessarily, when they that have the Goverment of Religion, shall come to have either the wisedome of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token of Divine Revelation ; that the Religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise ; and (without the feare of the Civill Sword) contradicted and rejected.

That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, Injoyning in him that formeth a Religion, or addeth to it when beleefc of it is allready formed, is the enjoyning of a belief e of £5Jj££*w" contradictories : For both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true : and therefore to enjoyne the beleife of them, is an argument of ignorance ; which detects the Author in that ; and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation super- naturall : which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against naturall reason.

That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, Doing is the doing, or saying of such things, as appeare to be c^fj^ry signes, that what they require other men to believe, is ^ei^on not believed by themselves ; all which doings, or say- they ings are therefore called Scandalous, because they be establish. stumbling blocks, that make men to fall in the way of Religion : as Injustice, Cruelty, Prophanesse, Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions, as proceed from any of these rootes, believeth there is any such Invisible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men wit hall, for lesser faults?

That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected of private ends : as when the belie fe they require of others, conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Riches, Dignity, or secure [59] Pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others.

Want of Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine the testi- Calling, can be no other, than the operation of Miracles ; '^Miracles or true ProPnecy» (which also is a Miracle ;) or extra ordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points of Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles ; those that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some Miracle, obtain no greater belief e, than what the Custome, and Lawes of the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in naturall things, men of judgement require naturall signes, and arguments ; so in supernaturall things, they require signes supernaturall, (which are Miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.

All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear in the Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children of Israel ; who when Moses, that had approved his Calling to them by Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but 40. dayes, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to them by him ; and *Exod\2. setting up * a Golden Calfe for their God, relapsed into 1,2.] the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had \ been so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, \--Joshua, and that generation which had seen the great * Judges 2. works of God in Israel, * were dead ; another generation 1 1 . arose, and served Baal. So that Miracles f ayling, Faith

* i Sam. 8. Again, when the sons of Samuel, * being constituted 3- by their father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and

judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, in other manner than he was King of other people ; and therefore cryed out to Samuel, to choose them a King after the manner of the Nations. So that Justice f ayling, Faith also fayled : Insomuch, as they deposed their God, from reigning over them.

And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians encreased wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles,

and Evangelists ; a great part of that successe, may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles of that time, had brought them selves, by their uncleannesse, avarice, and jugling between Princes. Also the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for the same cause abolished in England, and many other parts of Christendome ; inso much, as the fayling of Vertue in the Pastors, maketh Faith faile in the People : and partly from bringing of ^ the Philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the Schoole-men ; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance, and of Fraudulent intention ; and enclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland ; or with their will, as in England.